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Abstract
We model technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the decisions of pro￿t
maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a
Schumpeterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs earn monopoly pro￿ts by
inventing better goods and ￿nanciers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the
model is that ￿nanciers also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially pro￿table process
of innovation: Financiers can invent more e⁄ective processes for screening entrepreneurs.
Every existing screening process, however, becomes less e⁄ective as technology advances.
Consequently, technological innovation and, thus, economic growth stop unless ￿nanciers
continually innovate. Historical observations and empirical evidence are more consistent
with this dynamic model of ￿nancial innovation and endogenous growth than with existing
models of ￿nancial development and growth.
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11 Introduction
Financial innovation has been an integral component of economic activity for several millennia.
About six thousand years ago, the Sumerian city of Uruk blossomed as tradable debt contracts
emerged to facilitate a diverse assortment of intertemporal transactions underlying increased
specialization, innovation, and economic development (Goetzmann, 2009). In ancient Rome,
private investors steadily developed all of the features of limited liability companies, including
freely traded shares, an active stock exchange, and corporations that owned property and wrote
contracts independently of the individual shareholders. The creation of these corporations eased
the mobilization of capital for innovative, large-scale mining technologies (Malmendier, 2009).
To ￿nance the construction of vast railroad systems in the 19th and 20th centuries, ￿nancial
entrepreneurs developed highly specialized investment banks, new ￿nancial instruments, and
improved accounting systems to foster screening by distant investors (Baskin and Miranti,
1997; and Neal, 1990). Over the last couple of centuries, ￿nanciers continuously modi￿ed
and enhanced securities to mitigate agency concerns and informational asymmetries impeding
the ￿nancing of frontier technologies (Graham and Dodd, 1934; Allen and Gale, 1994; and
Tufano, 2003). More recently, ￿nancial entrepreneurs created venture capital ￿rms to screen
high-tech inventions and then modi￿ed these arrangements to support biotechnology endeavors
(Schweitzer, 2006).
Yet, models of economic growth generally ignore ￿nancial innovation and instead take the
￿nancial system as given and inert. Most frequently, ￿nancial arrangements are added to the
core models of endogenous technological change developed by Romer (1986, 1990) and Aghion
and Howitt (1991). For example, in King and Levine (1993) and Galetovic (1996), the ￿nancial
system a⁄ects the rate of technological change by determining the frequency with which society
allocates funds to those entrepreneurs with the highest probability of successfully innovating.
In Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), henceforth denoted as AHM, di⁄erences in
￿nancial development determine the resources available to entrepreneurs for innovation. In
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine (1991), and Obstfeld (1994), ￿nance in￿ uences long-run
growth by a⁄ecting the risk of investing in high-return projects. In these models, however,
￿nancial contracts, markets, and intermediaries do not emerge and evolve endogenously with
technological change.
Even in models where the size of the ￿nancial system changes as the economy develops,
the same pro￿t motives that underlie technological innovation do not spur ￿nancial innovation.
In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), ￿nancial intermediaries produce information about in-
2vestment projects and thereby improve capital allocation. Since there is a ￿xed cost to joining
￿nancial intermediaries, growth means that more individuals can a⁄ord to join and bene￿t from
￿nancial intermediation, which enhances the e¢ ciency of capital allocation and accelerates eco-
nomic growth. Thus, economic growth and membership in the ￿nancial intermediary evolve
together. In Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010), ￿nancial intermediaries invest resources
to monitor ￿rms. When ￿nancial institutions invest more resources, this enhances capital allo-
cation and accelerates growth. Yet, in these models, improvements in the e⁄ectiveness of the
monitoring technology are ultimately exogenous, so that the rate of ￿nancial innovation is not
determined by the choices of pro￿t maximizing agents.
In this paper, we model both technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the
pro￿t maximizing decisions of individuals and explore the implications for economic growth.
We start with a textbook model of Schumpeterian growth, where entrepreneurs seek to extract
monopoly pro￿ts by engaging in the costly and risky process of inventing new goods and
production methods (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Financiers arise to screen potential innovators
and identify the most promising ones.
A novel and de￿ning feature of our model is that ￿nancial entrepreneurs also innovate
to maximize pro￿ts. Financiers can engage in a costly and risky innovative activity that, if
successful, allows them to screen entrepreneurs better than competing ￿nanciers. Successful
￿nancial innovation, therefore, generates monopoly rents for the ￿nancier, just as successful
technological innovation generates monopoly rents for the technological entrepreneur. Unlike
Boyd and Prescott (1986), coalitions of agents - ￿nancial institutions - do not emerge to screen
and monitor entrepreneurs. Rather, individuals are willing to pay for information about entre-
preneurs, so ￿nanciers arise to provide this information. Moreover, we endogenize the actions
of ￿nanciers. Financiers maximize pro￿ts by seeking to create better screening technologies
than their competitors.
A second noteworthy feature of the model is that every existing screening methodology
becomes less e⁄ective at identifying promising entrepreneurs as technology advances. For ex-
ample, the processes for screening the builders of new, cross-Atlantic ships in the 16th century
were less e⁄ective at screening innovations in railroad technologies in the 19th century. The
methods for screening pharmaceuticals in the 1960s are less appropriate for evaluating biotech-
nology ￿rms today. At the same time, technological innovation increases the potential pro￿ts
from ￿nancial innovation. Thus, technological innovation makes existing screening technologies
obsolete and enhances the returns to inventing improved screening methods. For example, the
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banks, new contracts, and more elaborate reporting standards to screen railroads and to cre-
ate venture capital ￿rms to better evaluate and monitor new high-tech ￿rms. Financial and
technological innovations are inextricably linked.
Two central, interrelated implications of the theory are that (1) technological change
and ￿nancial innovation will be positively correlated and (2) economic growth will eventually
stagnate unless ￿nanciers innovate. Technological change increases the returns to ￿nancial
innovation, and improvements in the screening methodology boost the expected pro￿ts from
technological innovations. At the extreme, in the absence of ￿nancial innovation, existing
screening methods will become increasingly obsolete as technological innovation continues, so
that the probability of identifying successful entrepreneurs falls toward zero, eliminating growth.
Pro￿t seeking ￿nanciers, however, can avoid economic stagnation by creating new, more e⁄ec-
tive screening technologies. The drive for pro￿ts by ￿nancial and technological entrepreneurs
alike, therefore, can produce a continuing stream of ￿nancial and technological innovations that
sustain long-run growth.
Though the major contribution of this paper is the development of a theoretical model
in which the pro￿t maximizing decisions of technological and ￿nancial entrepreneurs drive
economic growth, we also present three types of evidence that advertise the value of this
dynamic model of ￿nancial innovation and endogenous growth. First, the model predicts
that technological innovation should be positively correlated with ￿nancial innovation. We
assess this prediction by examining whether labor productivity growth in the ￿nancial sector is
correlated with that of other industries from 1967 to 2000 in the United States. The correlation
coe¢ cient between productivity growth in the ￿nancial and manufacturing sectors is almost
one (0.99), suggesting a powerful link between technological and ￿nancial innovation.
Second, cross-country growth comparisons further emphasize the central role of ￿nancial
innovation in economic growth. AHM show that the level of ￿nancial development, as measured
by the ratio of private credit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shape whether a country
converges to the technological leader. Our theory suggests that it is the rate of ￿nancial
innovation that determines the likelihood of a country converging to the growth rate of the
frontier economy. This is what we ￿nd. Using the growth rate of the ratio of private credit to
GDP as an empirical proxy for ￿nancial innovation, the evidence is consistent with the view
that ￿nancial innovation is crucial for economic growth. While the growth rate of private credit
to GDP is an unsatisfactory measure of improvements in screening technology, this additional
4piece of evidence underscores the value of incorporating ￿nancial innovation into our models
of entrepreneurship and growth.
Third, as emphasized above and developed further below, history exempli￿es the impor-
tance of ￿nancial innovation for igniting and sustaining economic growth. For example, Harris
(1994; 1997; 2000) stresses that legal impediments to ￿nancial innovation, especially limits on
the creation of limited liability corporations, temporarily slowed technological invention and
economic growth in England and France during the 18th and 19th centuries. In particular,
restrictions on the use of limited liability impeded ￿rms from growing to e¢ cient sizes and
shareholders from diversifying their investment across several ￿rms while receiving a reliable
￿ ow of information about those ￿rms. Similarly, Kuran (2006) links the comparative underde-
velopment of the Islamic world with stagnant ￿nancial arrangements. Although the ￿nancial
rules of Islam were e¢ cient for a few centuries, they were not adaptable enough to permit the
creation of new ￿nancial arrangements, such as the limited liability corporation, to mobilize,
pool, and administer the funds of thousands of investors. According to Kuran (2006), the
Islamic system stymied ￿nancial innovation and therefore severely hindered technological inno-
vation and growth. As another example, recent research shows that when regulators removed
impediments to competition in the U.S. banking system, this stimulated the development and
spread of new ￿nancial technologies for screening ￿rms, with positive rami￿cations on entrepre-
neurship and economic growth (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Black
and Strahan, 2002; Kerr and Nanda, 2009; and Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010). In the paper,
we discuss the series of ￿nancial innovations that spurred the development of railroads, as well
as other examples from ￿nancial history, to further stress the indispensable role of ￿nancial
innovation in supporting continuous improvements in technology.
From a policy perspective, the paper stresses adaptability and innovation as key elements
for sustaining economic growth. Growth eventually stops in the absence of ￿nancial innovation.
Legal, regulatory, or policy impediments to ￿nancial innovation stymie technological change
and economic growth in the long-run. Rather than stressing policies that support a particular
level of ￿nancial development, the theory highlights the value of policies that facilitate e¢ cient
improvements in screening technologies (Merton, 1995).
Furthermore, our paper contributes to debates on the costs and bene￿ts of ￿nancial
innovation provoked by the recent ￿nancial crisis. Many argue that recent ￿nancial innovations
facilitated the extraction of short-run pro￿ts for ￿nanciers, not improvements in screening
methodologies that enhance social welfare. For example, Dell￿ Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008),
5Mian and Su￿(2009), and Keys, et al. (2010) show that securitization, one of the key ￿nancial
innovations in recent years, reduced lending standards and increased loan delinquency rates,
while simultaneously boosting the supply of loans and ￿nancier pro￿ts (Loutskina and Strahan,
2009). Financial innovation can be harmful. We do not conduct an assessment of the pros and
cons of ￿nancial innovation. Rather, we develop a new theoretical framework in which pro￿t
maximizing ￿nanciers play a central role in the process of endogenous growth and provide
empirical evidence consistent with the model￿ s predictions. In the future, this framework can be
extended to include policy and other distortions that create incentives for ￿nancial innovations
that increase ￿nancier pro￿ts at the expense of social welfare. From this perspective, our
paper represents an initial step toward building a more general, dynamic theory of endogenous
growth, ￿nancial innovation, and ￿nancial regulation.
One limitation of our analysis is that we de￿ne ￿nance narrowly. We examine only the
role of the ￿nancial system in screening innovative activities. We do not model risk diversi￿-
cation, pooling, and trading. We do not examine the role of the ￿nancial system in reducing
transaction costs, enhancing the governance of ￿rms, or in mitigating the moral hazard and
adverse selection problems arising from informational asymmetries. Rather, we focus on one
critical ￿nancial function ￿acquiring and processing information about investments before they
are funded.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic structure
of the model, and Section 3 solves the model, determines the factors underlying steady state
growth, and derives testable implications. Section 4 provides additional historical examples
and suggestive empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Structure of the Model
We begin with the Schumpeterian growth model developed by AHM. Economic activity extends
over in￿nite discrete time. There are k countries that do not exchange goods or factors, but
do make use of each others￿technological ideas. There is a continuum of individuals in each
country whose ￿xed population is normalized to one so that aggregate and per capita quantities
coincide.
Each individual lives two periods and is endowed with three units of labor in the ￿rst
period of life and none in the second period. The utility function is linear in consumption, so
that U = c1 + ￿c2; where c1 is consumption in the ￿rst period of life, c2 is consumption in
the second period of life, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the rate at which individuals discount the utility of
6consumption in period 2 relative to that in period 1.
2.1 Final Output
In every period the economy produces a ￿nal good combining labor and a continuum of spe-
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where xi;t is the amount of intermediate good i in period t with technology level of Ai;t: L is
the labor supply, which is normalized to unity. The ￿nal good Z is used for consumption, as
an input into entrepreneurial and ￿nancial innovation, and as an input into the production of
intermediate goods.
The production of the ￿nal good, which we de￿ne as the numeraire, occurs under perfectly








In each intermediate goods sector i, a continuum of individuals with an entrepreneurial idea
is born in period t ￿ 1. Only one entrepreneurial idea per sector has a positive probability of
producing a successful innovation and improving the production technology in period t: The
quality of each entrepreneurial idea is unknown to the entrepreneur and households looking to
invest in entrepreneurial ideas. As we discuss below, ￿nanciers arise to screen entrepreneurial
ideas and identify the entrepreneur that is capable of innovating.
Let ￿e
i;t equal the probability that the capable entrepreneur successfully innovates, so
that the level of technology of intermediate goods sector i in period t, Ai;t, is de￿ned as
Ai;t =
( ￿ At with probability ￿e
i;t




where ￿ At is the world technology frontier. The world technology frontier grows at a constant
rate g, which is taken as exogenous for now, but which we derive formally below.
If the capable entrepreneur successfully innovates, she can produce intermediate goods
at the rate of one unit of intermediate good per one unit of ￿nal good as input. Entrepreneurs
who do not innovate can produce at the rate of one unit of intermediate good per ￿ units of ￿nal
7good as input, where ￿ > 1. Thus, successful innovators enjoy a production cost advantage
over entrepreneurs who do not innovate. In every intermediate sector, there exists an unlimited
number of people ￿the competitive fringe ￿capable of producing at the rate of one unit of
intermediate good per ￿ units of the ￿nal good as input.
Successful innovators become the sole producers in their respective intermediate sectors.
They charge a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe (￿) and earn monopoly
pro￿ts. In intermediate goods sectors where entrepreneurial innovation is unsuccessful, produc-
tion occurs under perfectly competitive conditions, so that the price equals the unit cost of the
competitive fringe (￿) and unsuccessful innovators earn zero pro￿ts. Thus, in all intermediate
goods sectors, the price, pit, equals ￿.
Successful innovators earn monopoly pro￿ts. Using the demand function for intermediate








Since pro￿ts per intermediate good equal ￿￿1, a successful innovator in sector i earns pro￿ts
of








Financiers screen individuals with entrepreneurial ideas and assess which entrepreneur is ca-
pable of innovating. In return for their screening services, ￿nanciers are paid a share of entre-
preneurial pro￿ts which we describe formally below. Financiers provide their assessments of
entrepreneurial ideas to households, who use this information to make investment decisions. In
the absence of pro￿t maximizing ￿nanciers that screen entrepreneurial ideas, innovative activ-
ity ceases because households are unwilling to provide resources to an unscreened entrepreneur
since the probability of the project being successful is of measure zero. For the same reason,
households do not invest in entrepreneurs that ￿nanciers designate as incapable of innovating.
A ￿nancier can earn monopoly rents by successfully inventing a better screening tech-
nology than competitor ￿nanciers. In period t￿1, a single ￿nancier has a positive probability
of successfully innovating and improving the screening technology in each intermediate sector
i. A successful ￿nancial innovation in sector i allows the respective ￿nancier to identify the
capable entrepreneur in sector i with probability one. In the absence of successful ￿nancial




i;t equal the probability that a ￿nancier successfully innovates and improves the
screening technology in sector i, so that the level of screening technology in intermediate goods
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We index the level of the potential frontier of the screening technology by the aggregate level of
the world technology frontier, ￿ At. As the technological frontier advances, the frontier screening
technology also advances, though the actual screening technology, mi;t, may lag behind the
frontier screening technology, ￿ At. If ￿nancial innovation is successful, the ￿nancier becomes
the monopolist producer of the frontier screening technology, ￿ At; in her sector and identi￿es
the capable entrepreneur with probability one. As with entrepreneurial innovation, if ￿nancial
innovation is unsuccessful in sector i, then an unlimited number of individuals ￿a competitive
fringe ￿can screen entrepreneurial ideas in sector i during period t￿1 using the economy-wide
screening technology of period t ￿ 1, mt￿1, which equals the average of the screening tech-
nologies across all sectors in period t ￿ 1. This common, economy-wide screening technology
across non-￿nancially innovating sectors is a simplifying assumption, which derives from the
observation that entrepreneurs in each sector aim at implementing the world technology fron-
tier, ￿ At, which encompasses ideas and technologies across all sectors. Thus, innovative activity
in, for example, biotechnology in period t will likely involve the use of recent innovations in
information technology, chemistry, and other sectors, so that screening potential innovations
in biotechnology requires the ability to screen technologies from these other sectors as well.
Rather than de￿ne the common, economy-wide screening technology across non-￿nancial inno-
vating sectors as the average of last period￿ s screening technologies, we could choose any point
in the distribution of sector screening technologies from last period without loss of generality.
For example, if we were to choose the maximum screening technology across all sectors from
last period and use this as the common screening technology for non-￿nancially innovating
sectors, we obtain the same qualitative predictions. 1
The probability that the ￿nancier in sector i correctly identi￿es the capable entrepreneur,
￿i;t, is a function of the gap between the level of the intermediate sector￿ s frontier technology
1Furthermore, allowing each intermediate sector to maintain its own screening technology over time would
deliver a cumbersome analysis without changing the qualitative predictions of the model.
9and the level of the screening technology. If the ￿nancier successfully innovates, then there is no
gap. If the ￿nancier does not successfully innovate, then the ￿nancial gap re￿ ects the di⁄erence
between the technological frontier and last period￿ s economy wide screening technology, so that:
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Consequently, a successful ￿nancier ￿a ￿nancier that successfully innovates in sector i
in period t￿1 ￿will choose the entrepreneur capable of delivering a technological innovation in
period t with probability one. In a sector where the ￿nancier does not innovate in period t￿1,
the probability of correctly identifying the potential entrepreneur is less than one, equaling the
ratio of the economy￿ s screening capacity as of period t￿1, mt￿1, relative to the technological
frontier of period t:
In the presence of technological innovation in the world frontier but in the absence of do-
mestic ￿nancial innovation, the screening technology becomes increasingly ine⁄ective at identi-
fying the capable entrepreneur. This growing ￿nancial gap reduces the probability that society
invests in the best entrepreneurial ideas with adverse rami￿cations on technological change.
More formally, as technology advances (as ￿ At increases) and without a concomitant advance
in the screening technology, mi;t, the probability that the ￿nancier successfully identi￿es the
capable entrepreneur, ￿i;t = mi;t= ￿ At, falls.
Financiers are paid by entrepreneurs in the form of a share, ￿i;t, of entrepreneurial
pro￿ts. Though all screened entrepreneurs sign a perfectly enforceable contract regarding this
share, only one entrepreneur is designated as capable and receives external ￿nancing. The
￿nancier￿ s fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts, ￿i;t, is determined endogenously in the model.
In sectors with successful ￿nancial innovation, the successful ￿nancier is the sole provider of
the frontier screening technology and charges a monopoly price in the form of a high share
of entrepreneurial pro￿ts. More speci￿cally, the successful, monopolist ￿nancier charges a
price such that the entrepreneur is indi⁄erent between using the frontier screening technology
and using the old screening technology available to the competitive fringe. For simplicity but
without loss of generality, we assume that the perfectly competitive fringe can provide the
old screening technology at zero cost, so that entrepreneurs using the competitive fringe of
￿nanciers keep 100% of the pro￿ts.
102.4 Timing of Events
At the beginning of each period t￿1 in each sector, unscreened entrepreneurs solicit screening
from the ￿nancier with the potential to innovate. The ￿nancier both borrows money from
households and invests in ￿nancial innovation. If the ￿nancier fails to innovate, the compet-
itive fringe of ￿nanciers use the existing screening technology as of period t ￿ 1 to identify
and designate one entrepreneur as capable. If the ￿nancier successfully innovates, then this
new screening technology identi￿es the capable entrepreneur with probability one. Next, the
entrepreneur designed as capable borrows from households and invests in innovation.
In period t, uncertainty about entrepreneurial innovation is resolved. If the entrepreneur
successfully innovates, she repays the households for their investment in innovation, pays the
contracted fraction of pro￿ts to the ￿nancier, and keeps the remaining pro￿ts. If feasible, the
￿nancier then pays back households who lent money for ￿nancial innovation.
Figure 1 below summarizes all possible scenarios.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
113 Innovation and Aggregate Growth
3.1 Entrepreneurial Innovation
The probability that a capable entrepreneur successfully innovates in period t, ￿e
i;t, depends
positively on the quantity of ￿nal goods invested in entrepreneurial innovation during period




i;t)￿ ￿ At; ￿ > 1:
As in AHM, the cost of innovation in terms of ￿nal goods input increases proportionally with
the world technology frontier, ￿ At, so that it becomes more expensive to maintain an innovation
rate of ￿e
i;t as the technology frontier advances.
In equilibrium, each capable entrepreneur chooses Ne
i;t￿1 to maximize expected prof-
its. Given the contractual agreement between entrepreneurs and ￿nanciers, the entrepreneur
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Risk neutral individuals in the ￿rst period of life provide resources to entrepreneurs
designated as capable by ￿nanciers. They provide unlimited resources to entrepreneurs at a
sector speci￿c interest rate that is an inverse function of the quality of the screening technology
in the sector. De￿ning the risk free interest rate as r = 1=￿ ￿ 1, the interest rate charged
to an entrepreneur that is rated as capable by a successful ￿nancier is Re
i;t = 1+r
￿e
i;t . In turn,
households charge the interest rate of Re
i;t = 1+r
￿i;t￿e
i;t to entrepreneurs designated as capable
by the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers that conducted the screening using the economy wide
screening technology from the last period. Recall that ￿i;t = 1 for ￿nanciers that successfully
innovate, so these two interest rates are fully consistent.
First, consider entrepreneurs that are screened by successful ￿nanciers, so that the entre-
preneur designated as capable knows with probability one that she is the capable entrepreneur.
She then chooses to borrow and invest in innovation, such that the pro￿t maximizing probability








12where we assume that ￿￿ < ￿￿￿ to ensure that the equilibrium probability of successful en-
trepreneurial innovation is less than one (￿￿
e;t < 1) under perfect ￿nancial screening. Since
entrepreneurs repay ￿nanciers only when they successfully innovate, ￿i;t does not a⁄ect invest-
ment in entrepreneurial innovation.
From (9), the comparative statics with perfect screening are intuitively appealing. En-
trepreneurs invest more in innovation and boost the probability of success when (1) the net
pro￿ts per unit of the intermediate good, ￿, are higher and (2) the cost of entrepreneurial
innovation, ￿; is lower. If ￿ and ￿ are common across sectors, then ￿e￿
i;t = ￿e￿ 8 i.
Substituting (9) into (8) yields the net expected pro￿ts of an entrepreneur screened by
a successful ￿nancier,
￿e￿
i;t = (1 ￿ ￿i;t)￿e￿’ ￿ At; (10)
where ’ = ￿￿(1 ￿ 1=￿):
Second, consider entrepreneurs screened by the competitive fringe of ￿nanciers using the
old, imperfect screening technology, mt￿1. Under these conditions, the entrepreneur keeps all
the pro￿ts, so that ￿i;t = 0. Thus, the expected pro￿ts to an imperfectly screened entrepreneur,
￿e0
i;t; i.e., the expected pro￿ts of an entrepreneur screened using the old screening technology is
￿e0
i;t = ￿￿i;t￿e
i;t￿ ￿ At ￿ Ne
t￿1: (11)








Substituting (12) in (11) one derives the maximal net expected revenue of an entrepreneur




￿￿1 ￿e￿’ ￿ At: (13)
The following Lemma establishes the properties of entrepreneurial innovation in sector i
when using the old screening technology, ￿i;t,
Lemma 1 The properties of entrepreneurial innovation in sectors using the old, imperfect
screening technology:
1. Entrepreneurs invest more in innovation and boost the probability of successful innovation
when (1) the net pro￿ts per unit of the intermediate good, ￿, are higher and (2) the cost













Proof. These properties follow by directly di⁄erentiating equation (12) ￿
We can now derive the fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts accruing to the entrepreneur
(1￿￿i;t) and ￿nancier (￿i;t). For the unrated entrepreneurs in the beginning of period t￿1 to be
indi⁄erent between choosing a contract with a successful ￿nancier or using the economy wide
screening technology supplied by the competitive fringe, these two alternatives must deliver
the same expected pro￿ts. Formally, (10) must equal (13), so that
￿i;t = 1 ￿ (￿i;t)
￿
￿￿1 : (14)
Equation (14) indicates that the better is the economy￿ s ￿nancial screening capacity
(higher ￿i;t) the lower is the fraction of entrepreneurial pro￿ts (￿i;t) that a successful ￿nancier
can demand. This occurs because if the standard screening technology is close to the frontier
screening technology, then the competitive fringe o⁄ers a close substitute. On the other hand,
if the available screening technology is a poor substitute for a successful ￿nancier￿ s newly
developed screening capabilities, then the ￿nancier can obtain a larger fraction of expected
entrepreneurial pro￿ts.
3.2 Financial Innovation
As with entrepreneurial innovation, the probability that the capable ￿nancier in sector i suc-
cessfully innovates during period t, ￿
f
i;t, depends positively on the quantity of resources invested







i;t)￿ ￿ At; ￿ > 1;
where the cost of ￿nancial innovation in terms of the ￿nal goods input increases proportionally
with the world technology frontier, ￿ At. Thus, it becomes more expensive to maintain the same
rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿
f
i;t, as the technological frontier advances since the entrepreneurs
that are screened by ￿nanciers are striving to reach the world technology frontier.
14The ￿nancier chooses N
f
i;t￿1 to maximize expected pro￿ts, ￿
f
i;t. Since a successfully in-
novating ￿nancier keeps the fraction ￿i;t of expected entrepreneurial pro￿ts, ￿e￿










The ￿nancier maximizes pro￿ts by borrowing N
f
i;t￿1 worth of ￿nal goods and investing
these resources in ￿nancial innovation. Risk neutral individuals lend ￿nal goods output to







, which is a function of the risk
free interest rate, r, the probability that the ￿nancier successfully innovates, and the probability
that the entrepreneur designated by the ￿nancier as capable successfully innovates. After
substituting (14) into (15), the ￿nancier chooses to borrow and invest in ￿nancial innovation
















where we assume that ￿f > ￿ to ensure that the rate of ￿nancial innovation is always less than
one.
3.3 Aggregating the Financial System
To examine the e¢ ciency of a country￿ s ￿nancial system, we aggregate the behavior of ￿nanciers
across individual sectors to focus on the average, or representative, probability that a ￿nancier





where ￿i;t equals the probability that the ￿nancier in sector i correctly identi￿es the capable
entrepreneur in sector i during period t. From equation (7), the average level of ￿nancial
e¢ ciency evolves according to the following equation:
￿t = ￿
f






The ￿nancial sector identi￿es the capable entrepreneur with probability one in the fraction ￿
f
t
of the sectors in which the ￿nancier successfully innovated last period. Since we aggregate
￿nancial e¢ ciency across a continuum of sectors, we ignore negligible relative size di⁄erences.
15In the remaining 1 ￿ ￿
f
t of the sectors, the ￿nancial sector identi￿es the capable entrepreneur
with a probability of
￿t￿1
1+g < 1.
To obtain the steady state level of average ￿nancial e¢ ciency, let ￿t = ￿t￿1 = ￿￿ and
￿
f
t = ￿f￿ in the steady state and then solve for ￿￿ from equation (17):
￿￿ =
￿f￿
g + ￿f￿: (18)
Directly di⁄erentiating equation (18) reveals an important comparative static of this
economy:
@￿￿
@￿f￿ > 0: (19)
The higher is the steady state rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿f￿; the more e¢ cient is the econ-
omy￿ s ￿nancial system at identifying capable entrepreneurs in the steady state, ￿￿.
The steady state pro￿t maximizing innovation probability of the ￿nancial system is












Finally combining (18) and (20), yields the implicit function
F(￿e￿;￿f￿;￿f) ￿ 0; (21)
which characterizes the equilibrium innovation rate of the ￿nancial system. The following
Lemma summarizes the properties of an economy￿ s ￿nancial innovation rate:
Lemma 2 The properties of ￿nancial innovation in the steady state
1. Financial innovation is an increasing function of the rate at which entrepreneurs innovate:
@￿f￿
@￿e￿ > 0:













Proof. Repeated di⁄erentiation of equation (20) according to the Implicit Function Theorem
delivers the results. ￿
The properties of ￿nancial innovation in equilibrium highlight the nexus between entre-
preneurial and ￿nancial innovation. Stagnant entrepreneurial innovation reduces the expected
pro￿ts from ￿nancial innovation, which in turn (a) reduces investment in ￿nancial innovation,
(b) slows the rate of improvement in the screening technology, (c) lowers the probability that
￿nanciers identify capable entrepreneurs, and hence (d) impedes technological innovation and
growth. Put di⁄erently, there is a multiplier e⁄ect associated with changes in entrepreneur-
ial innovation that reverberates through the rate of ￿nancial innovation back to the rate of
technological change.
Policies, regulations, and institutions that impede ￿nancial innovation have large e⁄ects
on growth. In particular, the cost of ￿nancial innovation ￿f a⁄ects the rate of ￿nancial and
hence technological innovation. Thus, countries in which it is more expensive to innovate
￿nancially (higher ￿f) will tend to grow slower than economies with less expensive barriers to
￿nancial innovation. Cross economy di⁄erences in the cost of ￿nancial innovation can arise for
many reasons. For example, a large literature suggests that some legal systems (for example
those that rely on case law) are more conducive to ￿nancial innovation than other systems
(such as those that rely less heavily on case law to adapt to changing conditions), which has
been documented by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003, 2005), Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2007), and Levine (2005a, 2005b).
3.4 Aggregate Economic Activity
This section aggregates an economy￿ s economic activity and examines its components. We





where aggregation is performed across the continuum of intermediate sectors.
To derive the law of motion of the average level of technological productivity, note that







t. Then, simply use the branches of Figure 1 and equation






















Inspecting (22) reveals that a country￿ s average technological productivity in period t + 1 is a
weighted average of sectors which implement the frontier technology, ￿ At+1; and of sectors using
the average technology of period t; At. The weights are functions of (a) the rate of ￿nancial
innovation, ￿
f
t+1, (b) the quality of the ￿nancial screening technology, ￿t+1, and (c) the proba-
bility of successful entrepreneurial innovation, ￿e
t+1. In particular, the productivity parameter
will equal ￿ At+1 both in sectors where ￿nanciers and entrepreneurs successfully innovated and in
sectors where ￿nanciers did not ￿nancially innovate, but where ￿nanciers nevertheless correctly
identi￿ed the capable entrepreneur, who in turn successfully innovated.
To derive the per capita gross domestic product within a country note that it is composed
of wages in the ￿nal goods sector and pro￿ts in the intermediate goods and ￿nancial sectors.
In terms of wages, note that ￿nal good production can be summarized by Zt = ￿At where
￿ = (￿=￿)￿=(1￿￿), which may be derived by substituting (4) into (1). Since by assumption
the ￿nal goods sector is competitive, the wage rate wt is the marginal product of labor in
the production of the ￿nal good, so that wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿At.2 In terms of pro￿ts,





1￿￿. Thus, per capita gross domestic
product is the sum of added value across sectors:
Yt = wt + ￿t￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿At + ￿t￿At (23)
where ￿t is the fraction of goods￿sectors with successful entrepreneurial innovation in period
t.
The following section characterizes the growth rate of Yt as a function of the underlying
entrepreneurial and ￿nancial structure of the economy.
2Unlike AHM where the proportionality of the wage rate to the domestic productivity determines the level
of technology investment in a credit constrained country, in our setup this ratio plays no role in determining
entrepreneurial investment. As shown in equations (9) and (12), the probability of entrepreneurial innovation
depends only on entrepreneurial pro￿ts and the level of the standard ￿nancial screening technology available to
those in sectors where ￿nanciers did not ￿nancially innovate. Domestic productivity just determines the amount
that a ￿nancier and an entrepreneur can borrow from households in period t. Since we assume that neither
￿nanciers nor entrepreneurs can hide the proceeds, households are willing to lend any amount at the prevailing
interest rates.
183.5 Economic Performance Across Countries
Denote a country￿ s distance from the world technological frontier as at = At= ￿ At. Each economy
takes the evolution of the frontier as given (see below how this is derived). Thus, the technology































where ￿￿ = ￿f￿￿e￿+(1￿￿f￿)(￿￿)
1=(￿￿1) ￿e￿ is the fraction of entrepreneurially innovating
sectors.
As it is common in other Schumpeterian models, we suppose that the growth rate of the
technological frontier, is determined by the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurial innovations in










The following Proposition summarizes the properties of an economy trying to implement
the world technology frontier.
Proposition 1 An economy￿ s steady state technology gap displays the following properties:
1. An economy blocking ￿nancial innovation will eventually stagnate irrespective of the ini-
tial level of screening technology, ￿t:
ass = 0 if ￿f￿ = 0:
2. Steady state technology gap is increasing at the rate of ￿nancial innovation, ￿f￿; i.e.,
@ass
@￿f￿ > 0




19Proof. The ￿rst property is obtained through direct substitution of ￿f￿ = 0 in ass: The remain-
ing two properties are derived by di⁄erentiating ass with respect to the relevant arguments.￿
The next section brie￿ y discusses the derived properties.
3.6 Dynamic versus Static Financial Markets
The model economy predicts that regardless of the screening capability of the ￿nancial system in
period t, ￿t, anything that prohibits ￿nancial innovation will eventually stop economic growth
as illustrated in Figure 2a.
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Figure 2a: Static Financial Markets
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Figure 2b: Dynamic Financial Markets
Initially, the consequences of impeding innovation may have negligible e⁄ects on the
rate of entrepreneurial innovation if the initial e¢ ciency of the screening technology is high.
Inevitably, however, as the world technology frontier advances and renders the initial screen-
ing technology increasingly obsolete, the absence of ￿nancial innovation produces a large and
growing gap between actual and potential growth.
Graphically, this scenario is equivalent to the H(at) curve in Figure 2b shifting downwards
over time in the absence of ￿nancial innovation. Eventually, the H(at) curve hits the origin as
in Figure 2a. This ￿nancially induced poverty trap is not caused by standard credit constraints.
Rather, it arises because ￿nanciers fail to innovate and improve the screening technology in
tandem with the world technology frontier. Introducing ￿nancial innovation in such a dormant
￿nancial system will boost growth, allowing for convergence to the world growth rate. It
is straightforward to show this by verifying that the per capita gross domestic product in a
20￿nancially innovating economy, i.e. ￿f￿ > 0; derived in (23), grows at the rate of the world
technology frontier.
Among economies that already ￿nancially innovate, further decreasing the barriers to
￿nancial innovation will shift the H(at) curve upwards in Figure 2b, increasing a country￿ s
steady state level of technology relative to the frontier, ass. In a similar fashion, factors a⁄ect-
ing entrepreneurial innovation also shape a country￿ s steady state technology gap. It is worth
stressing that given the interactive feedback e⁄ects between ￿nancial and entrepreneurial inno-
vation, interventions in either sector will have an amplifying e⁄ect on the economy￿ s innovation
rate.
4 Evidence
In this section, we present historical observations and empirical evidence regarding the main
assumptions and key predictions of the model. While these ￿ndings are consistent with the
model, they do not represent a formal test, or validation, of the model￿ s predictions. In par-
ticular, we are limited by the absence of a generally accepted measure of ￿nancial innovation
and fully valid instrumental variables for ￿nancial innovation. Nonetheless, these initial re-
sults advertise the potential usefulness of the model and the value of conducting more rigorous
assessments of the link between ￿nancial innovation and technological change.
4.1 Historical Examples
We begin by describing a series of ￿nancial innovations that facilitated the development of the
railroads in the 19th and 20th centuries. While we do not formally test hypotheses regarding
the connections between ￿nancial and technological innovation in the railroad industry, the
history of this central feature of the industrial revolution is fully consistent with this paper￿ s
emphasis on the co-evolution of ￿nancial and technological innovation.
Initially, the railway system was funded at the local level through private equity ￿nancing
because of the informational problems associated with screening and monitoring railroads from
afar (Baskin and Miranti, 1997, 134-146). Railroads were new, complex, and spanned a large
geographic area. Consequently, prominent local investors who could observe and monitor the
activities of railroads were virtually the only source of private capital during the early decades
of the 19th century (Chandler, 1954, 1965, 1977). This reliance on local ￿nance, however,
severely restricted the growth and development of railroads.
Since problems with acquiring and disseminating reliable information about railroads
21impeded pro￿table investments, ￿nancial entrepreneurs arose to mitigate this problem and
thereby spur improvements in railroad technology and expansion throughout England and the
United States (Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 137-138). Specialized ￿nanciers and investment
banks with reputations for integrity and competence emerged to both mobilize capital from
individuals to invest in railroads and then to oversee those investments by serving on the boards
of directors of railroad corporations (Carosso, 1970). In terms of specialized ￿nanciers, Baskin
and Miranti (1997, p. 137) note that after successfully ￿nancing the highly pro￿table line from
Manchester to Liverpool, the same British investors were prominent in funding rail lines in
other parts of England. In the United States, the major investment banking houses of J.P.
Morgan & Company and Kuhn-Loeb & Company mobilized funds from wealthy investors in
the United States and Europe to invest in the construction of railroad lines throughout the
United States. This additional capital not only improved transportation through more track
mileage, it also ￿nanced improvements in the quality of transportation in the form of faster,
more comfortable, and safer trains (Chandler, 1977).
Besides the emergence of specialized investment institutions, improvements in managerial
accounting methods and ￿nancial reporting facilitated the ￿nancing, expansion, and improve-
ment of railroads. As documented by Chandler (1965, 1977), the size and complexity of rail-
roads forced them to pioneer new methods for collecting, organizing, and assessing price, usage,
breakdown, and repair information. While these new forms of managerial control boosted oper-
ational e¢ ciency, they also made it easier for outside investors to assess and monitor railroads.
Overtime, ￿nanciers were able to assemble and evaluate this information on a monthly, and
then on a daily, and by the close of the 19th century on an hourly basis. These improvements
in monitoring reduced the barriers to external ￿nance, encouraged investment and innovation,
and thereby spurred growth in the railroad industry (Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 143-145).
Financial entrepreneurs also developed new ￿nancial instruments and greatly expanded
the use of existing securities to ease ￿nancial constraints on railroads, reduce the risk of bank-
ruptcy from short-term reductions in income, and customize the risks facing potential investors
in railroads. Baskin and Miranti (1997, p. 146-157) and Tufano (1997, p. 20-28) describe how
these ￿nancial instruments were combined to facilitate the ￿ ow of capital from diverse investors
to railroads. For example, preferred stock holders receive income before common stock holders
and are senior to common stock in bankruptcy, but preferred share holders do not have voting
rights and unlike debt holders they do not have the right to push a company into bankruptcy.
With income bonds, purchasers receive a promised stream of interest payments, but these
22payments are contingent on the railroad￿ s pro￿tability. This reduces the risk of very costly
bankruptcies from short-term reductions in pro￿ts. For other investors, railroads used liens,
rather than debentures, to attract risk averse investors, while deferred coupon debt and super
long maturity bonds allowed railroads to further custom design their securities for investors.
By providing a menu of securities with di⁄erent characteristics, railroads greatly expanded the
range of outside investors interested in railroad securities. Financial engineering facilitated the
expansion of and improvements in railroads in Britain and the United States.
As a second example, consider the commercial revolution of the Middle Ages. Lopez
(1976) and Braudel (1992) stress that increased trade facilitated specialization, which in turn
spurred innovative improvements in productive technologies. Furthermore, Goetzmann (2005)
stresses that the boom in international trade required improvements in the methodologies for
valuing transactions occurring at di⁄erent times, in di⁄erent currencies, with di⁄erent rates of
payment, and with a complex variety of weights and measures. Standard ￿nancial practices
were inadequate to address these new needs.
Indeed, Goetzmann (2005) shows that Leonardo of Pisa, the mathematician best remem-
bered for his "Fibonacci" series and for introducing Italy to the Arabic number system, wrote
his magnum opus, Liber Abaci, in 1202 primarily to facilitate commerce by developing more
precise, practical valuation techniques. Liber Abaci was taught throughout Europe, where it
was used to train entrepreneurs to overcome common obstacles, and brought Fibonacci consid-
erable recognition and wealth. Over time, Fibonacci￿ s contributions were essential ingredients
in the ￿nancial revolution that brought liquid securities markets, life insurance, annuities, mu-
tual funds, derivative securities, and deposit banking to Europe. These ￿nancial innovations
in turn spurred commerce and growth.
As a ￿nal example, the 20th century development of venture capital ￿rms to screen and
￿nance high-technology ￿rms and recent modi￿cations to this model to support biotechnology
further illustrate the vital role of ￿nancial innovation in encouraging technological change.
During the second half of the 20th century, new, high-technology ￿rms found it increasingly
di¢ cult to obtain ￿nancing. Commercial banks were reluctant to lend because there was not
yet a secure cash ￿ ow to repay the loan. It was di¢ cult to issue securities in public markets
because the technology was complex and di¢ cult to evaluate. Furthermore, the ultimate payo⁄s
were highly risky, and many high-technology ￿rms were run by scientists with no experience in
operating pro￿table companies (Gompers and Lerner, 2001).
Venture capital ￿rms arose to screen entrepreneurs and provide technical, managerial,
23and ￿nancial advice to new high-technology ￿rms. Venture capitalists frequently became
wealthy through their own successful innovations in high-technology, which provides a basis
of expertise for evaluating new entrepreneurs. In terms of funding, venture capitalists hold
large, private equity stakes that establish a long-term commitment to the enterprise, while
o⁄ering the possibility of enormous pro￿ts after several years. Furthermore, venture capitalists
become active investors, taking seats on the board of directors, providing regular advice, mak-
ing business contacts, and solving managerial and ￿nancial problems. Thus, this new ￿nancial
arrangement arose to facilitate the ￿nancing of frontier technological innovations, especially in
information technology.
As the frontiers of biotechnology opened, the venture capitalists needed to modify their
model for screening, monitoring, and ￿nancing technological innovation. In particular, success-
fully developing a new biotechnology frequently required the inputs of scientists, engineers, and
experts from a wide-variety of disciplines, enormous capital injections for sustained periods,
and expertise with drug regulations.
Overtime, venture capitalists adapted their funding structures to facilitate innovation in
biotechnology. In particular, they coordinated with large pharmaceuticals to ￿nance and assist
biotechnology ￿rms. Pharmaceutical companies employ, or are in regular contact with, a large
assortment of scientists and engineers, have close connections with those delivering medical
products to customers, and employ lawyers well versed in drug regulations. Making these
resources available to biotechnology ￿rms increases the probability of successfully creating a
valuable product. Furthermore, large pharmaceuticals help in the screening of biotechnology
￿rms, which makes external investors more con￿dent about participating in the ￿nancing of
these ventures. Thus, ￿nancial entrepreneurs facilitate technological innovators in their quests
to make new and better products.
4.2 Financial and Technological Innovation
We next examine a key feature of our model and one that departs from the existing literature
on ￿nance and growth: ￿nancial innovation is an increasing function of the rate at which
entrepreneurs innovate and vice versa. In other words, innovation in the real sector should be
positively correlated with innovation in the ￿nancial sector.
We assess this hypothesis using data on productivity growth across U.S. industries over
time from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which has annual data on labor pro-
ductivity growth by sector over the period 1967 to 2000. We use this data to contrast labor
24productivity in the ￿nancial sector with that of other sectors in the U.S. economy. Speci￿cally,
we test if there is a positive correlation over time between labor productivity growth in the
￿nancial sector and that in other sectors.
We compute labor productivity at the sectoral level as output per hour of all employees
in the sector. We use the 1987 U.S. SIC industry classi￿cation to group industries into the
￿nancial sector and manufacturing sectors, limiting the analysis to a comparison of the ￿nancial
services industry to the manufacturing industry. Speci￿cally, we use SIC code 602, denoting
commercial banks, as proxy for the ￿nancial sector, and SIC code 20, denoting manufacturing,
as proxy for the manufacturing sector.
Using these proxies for the ￿nancial sector and real sector, and using annual observations
on the percentage growth rate of labor productivity in either sector, we ￿nd that the correlation
between labor productivity growth in the ￿nancial sector and the labor productivity growth in
the real sector over the period 1967 to 2000 is high at 45 percent. The results are consistent
with the view that innovation in the real sector is strongly positively correlated with innovation
in the ￿nancial sector.
4.3 Financial Innovation and Endogenous Growth
Finally, we evaluate a second key feature of our model that di⁄ers from existing models of
￿nancial development and growth: Economies without ￿nancial innovation will stagnate, irre-
spective of the initial level of ￿nancial development.
This can be tested by extending the AHM regression speci￿cation to include not only
measures of ￿nancial development but also ￿nancial innovation. In particular, ￿rst consider
the AHM regression framework:
g ￿ g1 = b0 + b1F + b2(y ￿ y1) + b3F(y ￿ y1) + b4X + u; (26)
where g￿g1 is average growth rate of per capita income relative to U.S. growth over the period
1960-95, F is ￿nancial development in 1960, which is measured as credit to the private sector
as a share of GDP, y ￿ y1 is log of per capita income relative to U.S. per capita income, X is
set of control variables, and u is an error term.
Consistent with the model developed in AHM, they ￿nd that b1 is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero and that b3 is negative and signi￿cant. Thus, they ￿nd that ￿nancial
development accelerates the rate at which economies converge to the technological leader.
In contrast to AHM, our model stresses the importance of ￿nancial innovation, not
25￿nancial development. Indeed, in our model the level of ￿nancial development in any period
is an outcome of previous ￿nancial innovations. Building on our model above, we amend the
AHM regression framework as follows:
g ￿ g1 = b0 + b1F + b2(y ￿ y1) + b3F(y ￿ y1) + b4X + b5f + b6f(y ￿ y1) + u; (27)
where ￿nancial innovation, f, is measured as the average growth rate of ￿nancial development
over the period 1960-95. Note that f is measured over the sample period, while F is measured
at the beginning of the sample period. Our model predicts that b6 < 0 : the likelihood and
speed of convergence depends positively on ￿nancial innovation. The model also predicts that
b5 will be insigni￿cant, indicating a vanishing steady-state growth e⁄ect.3
For comparison purposes, we test these empirical predictions using the same dataset as
in Aghion et al. (2005) (and con￿rm the results using the more recent version, 6.2, of the Penn
World Tables). We start by running a simple cross-sectional OLS regression. The results are
presented in the ￿rst two columns of Table 1. We indeed ￿nd that the interaction between
￿nancial innovation (f) and deviation of growth from US growth (f(y ￿ y1)) is negative and
signi￿cant.
Next, we run two sets of instrumental variables (IV) regressions to address concerns about
endogeneity between growth, ￿nancial development and ￿nancial innovation. In column (3), we
use both legal origin dummy variables of the country and the change over the period 1973-1995
in the Abiad and Mody (2005) ￿nancial reform index as instruments for ￿nancial development
and ￿nancial innovation. Furthermore, for the interactive terms, F(y ￿ y1) and f(y ￿ y1), we
use the interactions of the initial real per capital GDP gap with the United States (y ￿ y1)
and both the legal origin dummy variables and the change in the ￿nancial reform index. The
presumption here is that countries with ￿nancial systems that remain ￿nancially depressed do
not innovate and improve their screening technologies and other ￿nancial practices. Thus, for
the ￿nancial development terms, F and F(y￿y1), we use the same instruments as in AHM. We
add corresponding instruments for the ￿nancial innovation terms, f and f(y ￿ y1), where the
￿rst-stage regressions are very strong, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments do not
explain variation in the endogenous variables at the one percent level. In column (4), we drop
￿nancial development and use the legal origin dummy variables as instruments for ￿nancial
3This prediction derives from the assumption than the technological leader already possesses a ￿nancial
system that innovates at the growth maximizing rate, so that faster ￿nancial innovation would not increase the
probability of picking capable entrepreneurs.
26innovation (following Beck et al. (2003, 2005) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007)), while also
including as instruments the interactions between the legal origin dummy variables and the
initial real per capital GDP gap with the United States. Again, the ￿rst-stage regressions
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments do not explain f and f(y ￿ y1):The IV results
are fully consistent with those from the OLS speci￿cation.
In sum, the regression results con￿rm the theory￿ s prediction: economies without ￿nancial
innovation stagnate, irrespective of the initial level of ￿nancial development. Put di⁄erently,
a faster rate of ￿nancial innovation accelerates the rate at which an economy converges to the
growth rate of the technological leader.
5 Concluding Remarks
Historically, ￿nancial innovation has been a ubiquitous characteristic of expanding economies.
Whether it is the development of new ￿nancial instruments, the creation of new corporate
structures, the formation of new ￿nancial institutions, or the development of new accounting
and ￿nancial reporting techniques, successful technological innovations have typically required
the invention of new ￿nancial arrangements. In this paper, we model the joint, endogenous
evolution of ￿nancial and technological innovation.
We model technological and ￿nancial innovation as re￿ ecting the pro￿t maximizing deci-
sions of individuals and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schum-
peterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs can earn monopoly pro￿ts by inventing
better goods. Financiers arise to screen potential entrepreneurs. Moreover, ￿nanciers engage in
the costly and risky process of inventing better processes for screening entrepreneurs. Successful
￿nancial innovators are more e⁄ective at screening entrepreneurs than other ￿nanciers, which
generate monopoly rents and the economic motivation for ￿nancial innovation. Every partic-
ular screening process becomes obsolete as technology advances. Consequently, technological
innovation and economic growth will eventually stop unless ￿nanciers innovate.
The predictions emerging from our model, in which ￿nancial and technological entre-
preneurs interact to shape economic growth, ￿t historical experiences and cross-country data
better than existing models of ￿nancial development and growth. Rather than stressing the
level of ￿nancial development, we highlight the vital role of ￿nancial innovation in supporting
economic growth. Institutions, laws, regulations, and policies that impede ￿nancial innovation
slow technological change and economic growth.
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Table 1. Financial Development, Financial Innovation, and Growth 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimates of a regression model that 
extends the AHM model of financial development and growth to include financial innovation. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP minus the real per capital GDP growth rate of the US, g - g1. Both 
are computed over the period 1960-95. F is financial development, measured as private credit to GDP in 1960, and f 
is financial innovation, measured as the growth rate of private credit to GDP over the period 1960-95. We include 
the same control variables as AHM. The regression in Column (1) is estimated using OLS and replicates the AHM 
results, limiting the sample to those countries with data on private credit to GDP in 1960. The regression in Column 
(2) is estimated using OLS and adds financial innovation, f. In regression (3), we use IVs for F, f, and the interactive 
terms, F(y-y1) and f(y-y1), where the instruments are legal origin, the change in the Abiad and Mody (2005) 
financial reform index over the period 1973-1995, and the interactions between the initial real per capital GDP gap 
with the United States (y-y1) and both the legal origin dummy variables and the change in the financial reform 
index. We are missing data on financial reform index for 9 countries. The IVs in regression (4) are the legal origin 
dummy variables and the interaction between legal origin and the initial real per capital GDP gap with the United 
States.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  g - g1  g - g1  g - g1  g - g1 
         
y - y1  -0.472  -0.305  0.233  -0.261 
  (0.529)  (0.404)  (0.598)  (0.517) 
F  -0.005  0.000  0.003   
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)   
F (y - y1)  -0.030**  -0.032**  -0.017   
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.020)   
f    0.047  0.037  0.001 
    (0.083)  (0.167)  (0.168) 
f (y - y1)    -0.091**  -0.310***  -0.240* 
    (0.041)  (0.105)  (0.137) 
Average years of schooling in 1960  0.200*  0.178*  -0.007  0.125 
  (0.112)  (0.097)  (0.114)  (0.116) 
Government size  0.013  0.004  0.010  -0.020 
  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Inflation  -0.001  0.011  -0.000  0.014 
  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Black market premium  -0.017***  -0.012**  0.004  -0.008 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Openness to trade  0.015**  0.009  -0.006  0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Revolutions and coups  -1.435  -2.553**  -3.487**  -4.104** 
  (0.959)  (0.992)  (1.570)  (1.706) 
Political assassinations  -0.007  0.036  0.287  0.343 
  (0.285)  (0.325)  (0.521)  (0.467) 
Ethnic diversity  -0.064  0.197  -2.378**  -0.556 
  (0.986)  (0.936)  (0.951)  (0.933) 
Constant  -2.172*  -2.195**  0.291  -0.610 
  (1.183)  (0.953)  (1.650)  (1.127) 
         
Hansen J-test (p-value)  --  --  0.26  0.19 
Observations  56  56  47  56 
R-squared  0.558  0.682  0.371  0.398 
 